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Prisoners of their business models: the decline of America’s leading 
vacuum cleaner firms during the Depression-era  
 
We examine the factors leading to the onset of organizational rigidities in the 
dominant vacuum cleaner firms of the 1920s, Hoover and Eureka. Strategies aimed at 
strengthening organizational commitment, in conjunction with low levels of 
organizational diversity – owing to managerial hierarchies dominated by men 
recruited from the sale force - restricted organizational flexibility and adaptability, 
while accentuating resistance to change. In conjunction with core competencies that 
largely reflected conditions in their previous rapid growth phases, organisation 
rigidity left both firms vulnerable to the new conditions of the Depression, including 
product and value chain innovation by a new entrant, Electrolux. 
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Introduction 
 
 The frequent inability of long-established corporations to effectively respond to 
radical changes in market conditions, or disruptive innovation, is a well-established 
phenomenon. The dynamic capabilities literature suggests that institutionalised capabilities 
may lead to “incumbent inertia” to environmental changes, with even minor innovations 
having the potential to undermine the value of the firm’s deeply-embedded knowledge.i This 
has been explained in terms of a sclerotic process whereby interdependencies between 
individual elements of the business model grow and harden across time, making changes to 
any element progressively more difficult.ii  
 A connected phenomenon is growing organisational homogeneity, which can reduce 
internal criticism of the business model.iii  Homogeneity is likely to be particularly strong in 
situations where managers are promoted from workers with common functional and skill 
backgrounds, especially where other types of diversity, such as gender or ethnicity, are weak 
or absent.iv Alan Raucher identified such problems in inter-war American chain stores, where 
higher management positions were generally filled by people who had entered as trainee store 
managers.v  
This article examines the causes of managerial inertia in consumer durables firms that 
used their own direct salesforces to sell their products, through case studies of the two largest 
vacuum firms of the 1920s, Hoover and Eureka. Direct sales firms were particularly 
vulnerable to managerial homogeny. Their workforces and, especially, their white-collar 
staff, were dominated by salesmen, while sales-related functions represented the bulk of their 
managerial positions and carried particularly high status and influence. Moreover, chronic 
labour turnover and a geographically dispersed salesforce led to heavy investments in 
“selling” the firm’s methods and “mission” to their employees – to strengthen organizational 
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commitment.vi While strong organizational commitment has a range of positive impacts, it 
can also act to restrict organizational flexibility, innovation and adaptability, while promoting 
blind faith in the firm’s established business model; particularly those elements that are 
perceived to be the distinctive managerial innovations underpinning its earlier success.vii  
 After briefly discussing the rise of the vacuum cleaner industry, this paper explores 
the strategies used to develop organisational commitment and conformity to the dominant 
firms’ increasingly standardised business models. It then focuses on how, from the second 
half of the 1920s, they faced growing organisational rigidity, in areas such as sales support, 
staff training and motivation, and organisational goals-setting. Such problems intensified 
during the Depression, accentuated by the rise of a new foreign entrant – Electrolux. We then 
use data from a detailed 1939 investigation of Hoover by consultant engineers Ford, Bacon & 
Davis to show how Hoover failed to modify its business model to counter Electrolux’s 
competitive threat and over-invested in sales support activities to such an extent that it had 
insufficient profits to match Electrolux’s sales commission rates.  
 
The rise of the door-to-door vacuum cleaner manufacturing and sales firm 
The first practicable powered vacuum cleaners appeared at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and by 1914 had been transformed into portable, electrically-powered, 
appliances suitable for the housewife. Until 1924 entry to the sector was tightly controlled 
under an agreement between the holder of the industry’s fundamental (Kenney) patent and 
the Vacuum Cleaner Manufacturers Association (representing early licensees of the Kenney 
patent), which effectively blocked the granting of further licenses and, therefore, market 
entry.  This led to the early industry being characterised by high profits, high and stable 
prices, and non-price competition.viii 
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 Most major inter-war vacuum manufacturers were established during this period. 
Hoover owes its origins to James Murray Spangler, an asthmatic janitor who devised a crude 
portable electric vacuum in 1907. He sold the idea to W. H. “Boss” Hoover, a man of 
considerable sales acumen, who started manufacturing cleaners in 1908 at his leather-goods 
works in North Canton, Ohio.ix America’s second most important vacuum manufacturer of 
the 1920s, Eureka, was established by the salesman Fred Wardell, who marketed the Eureka 
Model 1 from 1909 and, in 1910, founded the Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co. in Detroit.x Most 
other major manufacturers, such as Frantz Premier Vacuum Cleaner Co. (founded in 1910); 
Apex Electric Manufacturing Co. (1913) and P.A. Geiger Co. (1905), were also based in or 
around Ohio, reflecting a geographical clustering evident in other consumer durables sectors, 
such as washing machines (Iowa, especially Newton) and automobiles (south east Michigan). 
 National output rose from 702,000 units, retailing at $42,120,000, in 1919 to 
1,396,000, retailing at $64,811,000, in 1929. During the 1920s Hoover and Eureka vied for 
market leadership, collectively representing 40 per cent of national unit sales in 1921 and 41 
per cent in 1927. Even after the expiration of the Kenney patent early entrants continued to 
dominate (until the rise of Electrolux in the 1930s), owing to their development of “detail” 
patents that provided brand-specific advantages, and – more importantly – their early 
development of large salesforces that typically greatly outnumbered their production staff.  
 The 1920s provided a rapidly-growing potential market, owing to the spread of 
household electrification and the “scientific homemaking” movement, which advocated using 
scientific management methods to improve the efficiency of the homemaker, via a 
combination of modern housework techniques and new labour-saving technologies.xi 
Consumer durables were presented as taking the drudgery out of housework, thus enabling 
middle-class housewives to do their own housework without transgressing the social norm 
that heavy or dirty household tasks were unladylike.xii Scientific homemaking both promoted 
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the new durables and legitimized the salesman’s call at the door, as he could introduce 
himself as an instructor on methods to improve household efficiency. Door-to-door selling 
was a key promotional device for other electric durables, such as radios, refrigerators, and 
washing machines, though these tended to rely more heavily on local retailers’ salesmen, 
whereas vacuums were primarily marketed by salesmen recruited, trained, monitored, and 
paid by the manufacturers.xiii 
Vacuum firms were sales-driven companies. As Hoover’s official history noted, “the 
sales department is the most important part of an operation like this.”xiv The largest firms also 
placed substantial emphasis on product quality and innovation, though this reflected their 
need to develop strong proprietary features, so that salesmen could trumpet superiority over 
rival brands. Hoover’s principal selling point was its patented cleaning system – “carpet 
agitation” - promoted with the slogan “It Beats As It Sweeps As It Cleans”.xv In 1926, when 
their original agitator patents expired, Hoover introduced “positive agitation” -  with 
replaceable brushes and a rigid metal beater bar spiralled around the roller to more efficiently 
remove dirt. Eureka stressed its variety of innovative attachments, including paint spraying 
and hair drying functions.xvi Such “features” were underpinned by heavy investments in 
research and development. Hoover’s Experimental Department, established in 1919 to test 
materials and conduct R&D, employed 100 people by 1938.xvii  
Rather than following the Fordist strategy of achieving market dominance by 
undercutting competitors’ prices, Hoover and Eureka followed the practice of earlier market 
leaders in standardised machinery, such as Singer and McCormick Harvesting Co.. These set 
prices at the top of the range for their sectors, capitalising on any scale economies in 
production by investing lavishly in sales and marketing.xviii Indeed, despite substantial rises in 
output, vacuum retail prices and costs actually rose in real terms during the 1920s. Leading 
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manufacturers’ avoidance of price competition was also evident in other consumer durables 
sectors, such as refrigerators, washing machines, and (during the 1920s) radio.xix 
Vacuum manufacturers soon learned that the best way to demonstrate brand-specific 
advantages, and overcome strong consumer inertia and resistance, was door-to-door selling. 
Hoover moved to direct sales in around 1910, after observing that their retailers were not 
pushing Hoovers any more than the other products they stocked. They then placed salesmen 
in each dealer’s store – what became known as the “resale system”. In return for this service 
dealers accepted a lower commission (15 per cent, rather than the customary 33.3 per cent of 
the selling price); the remaining 18.3 per cent paying the salesman and the costs of his 
training and management. Then, from 1921, Hoover moved to a strategy of house-to-house 
canvassing (rather than only going to people’s homes if asked for a demonstration), though 
the retailer was still paid the 15 percent commission - for providing sales leads, allowing 
salesmen to call on prospects using its name, stocking inventory, and providing the 
instalment credit on which most vacuums were sold.xx  
The major firms developed large sales forces, organised geographically, into regions 
and territories. For example, in May 1927 Eureka’s national sales operation comprised four 
regional divisions, managing 30 branch territories. Each territory was structured into a 
wholesale section (serving the conventional store trade) and a retail section, selling under the 
resale system, as shown in Figure 1.xxi At this time Eureka employed 2,835 men in its outside 
sales organisation, while its total factory workforce numbered 625. In other words, it took 4.5 
people to sell the output of each production worker (excluding the contribution of the 
independent retailers with whom their salesforce collaborated).xxii Direct sales dominated 
total selling costs, though the major companies also invested substantially in advertising, to 
boost brand recognition and assert superior performance and proprietary features in advance 
of the salesman’s call.xxiii 
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[Figure 1 near here] 
 
Corporate strategies for cementing organizational commitment 
 One of the greatest challenges facing vacuum companies was the recruitment and 
retention of sales staff, owing to the job’s irregular (and often low) income, together with its 
low status – even among salesmen. Ford, Bacon & Davis found that some 90 per cent of 
applicants for Hoover salesmen’s jobs were people without money, who desired security and 
only considered sales because they could not find jobs offering a similar guaranteed income.  
Conversely, “Men who have been successful as salesmen in other lines will not take a job 
selling vacuum cleaners as they consider it beneath them. The public is inclined to look down 
on the work… so the fear of ridicule on the part of applicants is one of the principal things to 
be overcome.”xxiv  
Selling vacuums lacked the romance of high profile “masculine” products (such as 
cars) and was considered more distasteful even than washing machines - which in turn was 
more distasteful than selling refrigerators or radios.xxv The major firms thus devoted 
considerable time and resources to “selling” the job to current and prospective salesmen. In 
addition to attracting salesmen through adverts, which either carried the local dealer’s name 
or were “blind” (not specifying the employer or the exact nature of the work), Hoover also 
used its existing salesmen, managers, and dealers as recruiting agents. In the mid-1920s 
around 50 per cent of Hoover salesmen were recruited through newspaper advertising; 25 per 
cent through personal contact with the sales manager; 10 per cent through Hoover salesmen; 
5 per cent through Hoover dealers; 5 per cent through Hoover users, and the remaining 5 per 
cent through other sources.xxvi Similar methods were still being used in the late 1930s, though 
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there appears to have been more emphasis on “get-a-man” campaigns, whereby prizes were 
offered to salesmen who brought in new recruits.xxvii 
Manpower was viewed as the key determinant of sales. As a 1934 Hoover sales 
managers’ manual emphasised, “A Senior Manager’s major responsibilities are – building 
manpower and developing Field Managers to absorb manpower… the Senior Manager who is 
unable to perform these two major operations, falls short of fulfilling his obligations.”xxviii 
This emphasis on recruitment reflected chronic sales labour turnover ranging, in 1939, from 
100 per cent per annum for Hoover’s 1,500 leading salesmen who generated 80 per cent of 
sales to about 500 per cent for the other salesmen on their list. Leading salesmen earned 
around $31 per week and others regarded as “productive” about $13 per week; while the rest 
- numbering some 2,500 – 3,000 - sold only around one cleaner per month, on which they 
would earn around $13.xxix  
High labour turnover compelled sales managers to undertake two conflicting tasks, 
infusing the salesforce with positive messages - the value of the product, their sense of 
mission, and their ability to achieve sales goals – while avoiding heavy investments of time in 
salesmen who were never going to make the grade.xxx Hoover relied on payment by 
commission to weed out weaker salesmen, while seeking to support stronger salesmen  
through further training, sales quotas, competitions, and other incentives. Pressure to achieve 
targets sometimes tempted salesmen to use dubious, or even criminal, tactics and – like the 
chain stores – the vacuum firms found it necessary to develop systems to identify and address 
opportunistic behavior.xxxi Hoover’s monitoring included looking out for improbably high 
sales figures, which might reflect dubious methods, while Eureka employed a detective to 
check on their salesmen.xxxii 
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Problems of salesforce monitoring and motivation were accentuated by the fact that 
door-to-door salesmen and their field managers were physically distanced from top managers, 
– a problem also faced by chain stores.xxxiii However, the vacuum companies felt this more 
acutely, owing to chronic labour turnover and the lower typical calibre of their recruits.  The 
solutions developed to deal with this problem were, in turn, broadly similar to those 
embraced by other sales-orientated firms  - based on a behaviouralist set of management 
theories, later formalised by the “human relations” school.xxxiv  
Hoover’s system had strong similarities with the “inspirational” management formula 
pioneered by John H. Patterson at National Cash Register from the 1880s, which also acted as 
the blueprint for Frigidaire’s early direct selling operation.xxxv This encompassed both how 
sales managers communicated with their salesmen and the broader “positioning” of Hoover 
as a company with a mission and social conscience. Techniques pioneered by Patterson that 
were adopted by Hoover included sales quotas (and clubs for salesmen who made quota); 
systematic sales training; the use of detailed scripts to standardise the sales process; contests; 
motivational sales conventions; a model factory with a cafeteria, hospital, and recreational 
facilities; and – more broadly – a strategy of combining material incentives for staff with 
“purposeful” (symbolic) incentives.xxxvi Eureka (on the basis of the much thinner archival 
evidence for this company) appears to have adopted broadly similar strategies.xxxvii 
Managers were expected to employ interpersonal skills to identify salesmen’s 
motivations and align their personal goals with those of the company.xxxviii  Meanwhile 
salesmen’s masculine credentials were boosted by stressing their sales “mission”, the 
competitive nature of their calling, and the rewards for success – encompassing immediate 
financial rewards, symbolic incentives, and promotion prospects.xxxix  Hoover and Eureka 
emphasised their culture of meritocratic internal promotion, for example by trumpeting the 
success of senior managers who had risen through the ranks. While Hoover made some 
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senior appointments externally, especially during its early rapid-growth phase, it increasingly 
focused on internal promotion. In 1927 Bill Steele - a former medical student who had taken 
a summer job selling vacuums for Hoover and never returned to his studies – became the first 
person to rise from the position of salesman to Director of Sales, where he pursued a policy 
of internal promotion.xl Hoover also emphasised the salesmanship credentials of its top 
managers. For example, during the 1920s Hoover’s President, Herbert W. Hoover Sr., 
introduced the “sales pilgrimage”: all executives who had any connection with sales were 
required to sell vacuums door-to-door for one week each year, in an unknown area with no 
leads or help, and make the standard sales quota.xli  
Vacuum manufacturers also invested intensively in symbolic methods of boosting 
staff loyalty, effort, and conformity. This included building a “social” element into the firm’s 
dealings with its sales force. Francesca Carnevali has shown how collective social events, 
involving rituals such as parades, fancy dress, and other forms of pageantry and associational 
activity, assisted the development of nineteenth century trade associations as “social 
structures,” by embedding their members in a “community” and thereby tempering 
opportunistic behaviour.xlii From the late nineteenth century companies also began sponsoring 
picnics, dances, and other social events, together with the provision of social and recreational 
facilities, to present themselves as a community, harmonize employee relations, raise morale, 
and strengthen the bond between employee and firm. xliii  
Such strategies were more problematic for companies with a geographically dispersed 
workforce, who could not be expected to travel several hundred miles for a company picnic. 
Hoover therefore focused on large annual events to bring together its salesforce. In 1921 
Hoover held its first “International Sales Convention”. Managers and salesmen alike were 
accommodated in “Hoover Camp,” a tented city for 160 men comprising their entire 
managerial workforce, together with those salesmen who had met their “Maximen grade” 
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sales target. The event was designed to downplay differences in rank and emphasise the esprit 
de corps of the sales team. As an unpublished firm history notes, “The men slept, ate, and 
bathed under canvass. This event marks the time when the real Hoover spirit was brought to 
full flower”.xliv   
The following year’s convention was opened by a spectacular parade through North 
Canton, featuring costumed delegations from the field offices and elaborate floats 
representing the headquarters’ departments.xlv Then in 1923 the third international convention 
saw a more impressive parade, with almost 2,000 participants - including Hoover’s entire 
factory and office personnel in costume.xlvi Subsequent conventions during the 1920s 
witnessed ever more elaborate pageantry and entertainments. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
The conventions served a number of important functions, including celebrating the 
organisation’s values and acclaiming individual and collective success, to bolster salesforce 
commitment.xlvii They allowed successful salesmen opportunities to develop links with 
managers from field and headquarters operations, cemented by the shared experiences of the 
conventions’ antics. They also provided opportunities for bonding between sales teams 
spanning the U.S.A., Canada, and much of Europe, including elements of “misrule”: ritual 
events during which workers subverted the hierarchy in controlled settings, which were 
characteristic of sales conventions during this era.xlviii  
For example, the 1927 convention witnessed the usual fireworks, treasure hunts, 
vaudeville nights, skits, kangaroo courts, and an incident where, after Director of Sales Steele 
had arranged to have the Director of Hoover’s European sales organisation, M.C. Dizer, 
thrown in the swimming pool, “the entire European delegation induced the fully clothed Mr 
Steele that he should join Mr Dizer.”xlix Such public displays of community both helped to 
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build group solidarity and assert group “legitimacy”.l This was particularly important for a 
form of selling that had low public status and was widely seen as “un-masculine” (as it 
involved demonstrating work generally done by the housewife or maid). 
Co-ordinating the efforts of large sales teams required employees to share not only the 
corporation’s goals, but its “ideology” (a group of driving ideas regarding their sales mission, 
often expressed as ethical principles, such as serving the community).li Strong corporate 
ideologies and cultures boosted staff loyalty by instilling a sense of company “ownership” in 
the workforce.  Loyalty was important for effort, retention, and probity, while also reducing 
the risk of salesmen betraying the firm’s selling “system” to competitors.lii  
Corporate ideologies were introduced to salesmen during their initial training and 
subsequently promoted through sales team meetings and sales manuals, flyers, and employee 
magazines. Hoover launched its first magazine, Hoover Sweepings, for its salesmen and 
dealers in 1911; one of the earliest issues included items on countering customers’ objections, 
booklets available from its “Dealer’s Cooperation Department,” and a report on a recent 
dealer sales contest.liii Hoover’s magazines (which later branched to serve individual 
constituencies, such as its executives (Hoover Manager) and its retailers (Hoovergrams), 
served not only to communicate information, but to humanize and harmonize the salesman’s 
relationship with the company by celebrating the activities and achievements of the 
workforce and emphasising the company’s internal culture and sense of community.liv This 
boosted the “affective commitment” of the salesforce, a particularly useful strategy in a sector 
where direct monitoring was problematic.lv  
Hoover was careful to ensure that relationships between sales managers and their 
salesmen were also embedded in a strong social milieu. A 1925 field managers’ manual 
began with the following advice on sales meetings:  
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Make of each meeting a good fellowship-get-together that will help to cement the 
bonds of friendliness and good will for every member of your organization. Wherever 
possible, it is always a good idea to have some kind of music at sales meetings. Let 
some fellow volunteer with his banjo, guitar, fiddle, or mouth organ.  Begin each 
meeting with a rousing and enthusiastic song session. Have plenty of singing.lvi  
The manual also advised that, “Occasionally the meetings should take a distinctly 
social turn, at which time not only the woman demonstrators, office people, and 
representatives should be present, but the wives, sweethearts and mothers should be welcome 
and urged to attend. This creates a spirit that builds for permanency... It will carry the Hoover 
spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm into the home life of your salesmen and will do more good 
than a dozen lectures from your table.” lvii It also emphasised the importance of serving food 
and drinks (ideally made up on site) in fostering “Informality” and “Sociability”.lviii  Staff 
were encouraged to compose “Hoover songs”, set to the tune of popular hits, for singing at 
these events. 
 Fostering organisational commitment involved developing a system that was an 
“assemblage” of various components, configured to achieve these objectives.lix These 
included appropriate incentive systems; carefully specified and standardised training 
methods; staff magazines; an inspirational and motivational management style; and social 
events ranging from regular field-based meetings to annual grand conventions. As Kenneth 
Lipartito notes, parades, meetings, company songs and so forth are “expressive” activities, 
contributing to the assemblage that could be called Hoover’s “system” precisely because they 
were not reducible to economic incentives, but instead shaped shared identities.lx Hoover’s 
portfolio of commitment strategies evolved partly through a process of trial and error, but 
progressively hardened into an integrated system, owing to entrenched interdependencies 
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between their various organisational commitment strategies, and between these strategies and 
other elements of their business model.lxi    
Hoover’s selling formula and sales management model were also becoming 
increasingly standardised.  This diffused what Hoover and Eureka perceived to be best 
practice, but decreased the scope for individual innovation. Salesmen were given rehearsed 
arguments, a rigid demonstration set out in a series of predetermined steps, and set responses 
to common objections by prospective customers.lxii For example, in June 1924 Hoover 
introduced a “Standard” vacuum sales pitch via in The Hoover Sale, a booklet setting out a 28 
step demonstration, said to have been compiled from contributions by its sales force. In 1932 
the company sought further standardisation, via a new “Standard Way” plan of pre-
determined sales steps – again emphasising that it had been distilled from “months spent in 
the field accompanying some of our most consistently successful salesmen”.lxiii  By 1936 
Hoover’s sales manual covered 47 pages, largely comprising step-by-step sales dialogue.lxiv   
 A recurring theme was the importance of persistence – wearing down the prospect’s 
resistance by a series of prepared demonstrations, to be continued until the sale was closed. 
As The Standard Way counselled, “Keep on Demonstrating  until you have either sold The 
Hoover or exhausted every possibility of closing the sale.” lxv  Similarly, Steps had fifteen 
pages under the heading “KEEP ON SELLING”, beginning with the advice “Every 
demonstration results in a sale – either you sell the prospect or the prospect sells you. The 
prospect has many excuses to sell you, any one of which, if you buy, defeats your sale.”lxvi 
This echoed a contemporary industry view that salesmen principally competed against their 
prospects, pitting their willpower, assertiveness, and above all persistence against (typically) 
that of the housewife.lxvii  
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Vacuum salesmen appear to have been universally male (with the exception of female 
canvassers, used by a few firms to arrange the salesman’s call). This may have reflected the 
need to haul a heavy cleaner door to door, though it was true of most speciality direct sales 
work at this time. Employing women would have run counter the masculine sales cultures 
that Hoover, Eureka, and other sales-dominated companies sought to create and might have 
challenged their emphasis on meritocratic promotion – at a time when women were almost 
entirely excluded from corporate management roles.lxviii 
Maturity, rising costs, and the new competition 
 The dominant vacuum firm business model, based on an implicit assumption that 
sales maximisation was synonymous with success, led to the use of increasingly high cost 
marketing methods that inflated list prices and produced decreasing returns to investment in 
sales support and manpower by the late 1920s. For example, Hoover’s national advertising 
spend per vacuum sold rose from an average of $1.00 over 1919-23 to $1.69 over 1924-27 
and $2.15 over 1928-30.lxix More comprehensive data for Eureka are shown in Figure 3. 
From 1921-23 a rise in annual net sales from $3,107,000 to $8,215,000 was matched by a fall 
in the ratio of costs to sales and a major increase in profits. However, despite further 
substantial growth in net sales, to $12,780,000 by 1927, the ratio of costs to sales rose from 
73.86 to 82.56 per cent, while profit rates declined markedly and costs per unit rose from 
$29.58 to $39.00. This culminated in a fall in net sales to $10,100,000 in 1928 and, despite 
some recovery in 1929, Eureka’s profit ratio remained lower than any year since 1923, while 
its cost ratio was higher than any year from 1923-27. 
 [Figure 3 near here] 
 While more disaggregated data are not available, it seems extremely likely that total 
costs were being driven up by sales-related activities, rather than production costs. Eureka 
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had a trend of rising dollar and unit sales (during a period of only moderate inflation), while 
the sector demonstrated a long-term decline in production costs, relative to total costs. 
Production costs were estimated at 51.7 per cent of all costs for the three largest vacuum 
manufacturers in 1921, but had declined to only 27.6 per cent of Hoover’s total costs in 1938 
(excluding dealer discounts).lxx  
Yet there is no evidence of internal criticism regarding rising sales support and 
manpower costs. Hoover and Eureka had built up hierarchies of sales executives, promoted 
mainly from the ranks. Young companies have a tendency to recruit people who fit well with 
the corporate culture shaped by the skills, aptitudes, and values of their founders; for example 
Henry Ford, a, “gifed tinkerer… surrounded himself with other tinkerers, twenty years 
younger than he was, but like Ford without formal education.”lxxi Policies of internal 
promotion accentuated this bias by restricting the pool of candidates to those that had already 
been pre-screened to match the firm’s dominant discipline and values.lxxii Moreover, it 
deprived them of the benefits of external hiring – which has been identified as a significant 
mechanism for disrupting established routines and facilitating change. The benefits of 
external hires are found to increase with the age of the corporation, as they stimulate 
explorative activities, diminish “groupthink” and resistance to change, and introduce “distant 
knowledge” derived from working in other organizations.lxxiii 
Executive conformity was accentuated by their training, indoctrination into the 
Hoover culture, and – as junior managers – their task of convincing salesmen that the firm’s 
products, system, and extensive investments in sales support activities constituted the 
optimum business model. In a sector where belief in the product and the sales formula took 
on almost religious connotations, scepticism of the orthodox approach could easily be 
interpreted as heresy. The scope for criticism had been further reduced by the introduction of 
increasingly standardised and bureaucratised salesforce training procedures, which prized 
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strict conformity to their systems. This parallels Raucher’s findings that economic maturity 
brought with it organizational rigidity for the variety store chains, with executives ingrained 
in their firm’s system struggling to react to the new conditions of the late 1920s and the 
Depression era.lxxiv Hoover’s self-image as a sales-orientated organisation also inhibited 
challenges to the firm’s dominant sales logic from staff in other managerial specialisms, such 
as accounting. Scholars have identified a tendency for companies to disproportionately 
attract, reward, and listen to people with skills reflecting their “dominant discipline”, or 
function, while those from functions seen as subordinate typically have weaker influence.lxxv 
Christensen, Bartman, and Bever identify a tendency towards business model rigidity, 
owing to growing interdependencies between the model’s individual elements, which leads to 
innovation focused around “sustaining innovations” – value-adding improvements to existing 
products for current target markets.lxxvi  This pattern was evident in Hoover, which focused 
on improvements to its upright cleaner format throughout the inter-war years. They also 
predict that when such investments no longer generate adequate additional profitability, cost-
reducing innovations aimed at improving the efficiency of the business model will increasing 
dominate, as “the voice of the shareholders drowns out the voice of the customer”.lxxvii 
However, at Hoover these pressures were severely muted, as it was a private, family-owned, 
firm until 1943 and was headed by members of the Hoover family until 1966 (apart from 
John Frank Hattersley’s brief term as President from 1951 until January 1954, when he was 
ousted following an acrimonious family battle).lxxviii  
During the 1920s vacuum manufacturers had faced an expanding market owing to 
rapid growth in the number of wired homes, together with rising prosperity, the escalating 
cost of domestic servants, and growing popular familiarity with powered domestic 
appliances. However, the Depression witnessed a dramatic fall in sales. From 1929 to 1933 
annual unit sales of floor-type vacuum cleaners declined from 1,253,000 to 548,000, in 
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contrast to refrigerators and washing machines, that had recovered beyond their 1929 unit 
sales.lxxix  Conversely, vacuum manufacturers generally managed to maintain list prices, 
despite sharp price falls for most other durables, and witnessed relatively few corporate 
liquidations. However, the two leading firms of the 1920s, Hoover and Eureka, both 
witnessed severe falls in market share.  
Eureka was by far the worst affected. In 1930 they employed an army of over 4,000 
door-to-door salesmen, supported by 35 major branch offices in large U.S. cities, and 100-
150 sub-branches (sales offices) which ran the customer credit, stocked inventories, and 
supervised retailers working with Eureka under the resale plan.lxxx Around 50 per cent of sales 
were made directly, around 25 per cent under the resale plan, and the remainder from dealers 
who purchased cleaners outright from the factory. The heavy costs of Eureka’s branch 
network, inventories, and instalment accounts impacted on the prices of all their machines - 
even those sold through conventional retail channels - as it was impractical to charge one 
price to final customers purchasing from a door-to-door salesman and a lower price for the 
same models sold through stores.lxxxi During the depression high costs were translated into 
huge losses. Eureka’s sales had peaked in 1927 at $12,780,000, generating a profit of 
$1,806,000. However, sales fell sharply after 1929 - to $4,297,000 in 1931, with an annual 
loss of $1,163,000.lxxxii  
Faced with potential bankruptcy, Eureka responded by terminating their main direct 
sales operation, closing their sub-branches, slashing their branch office staff, and focusing on 
sales via the resale system and through “distributor-dealers” who paid their own salesmen’s 
commission and acted as wholesalers for local retailers. This gave them a tiny profit of 
$18,420 for the first six months of 1932, but on a drastically reduced turnover of only 
$1,360,360 for the whole of 1932.lxxxiii Yet direct selling per. se. was not the real problem; a 
trade article noted that total 1933 vacuum sales were almost completely down to four 
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companies - Hoover, Electrolux, Airway, and Premier –which relied on direct selling as their 
sole or (for Premier) main sales channel. Indeed Airway’s strong door-door selling 
performance, despite raising its prices, was said to have exerted a strong demonstration effect 
on other manufacturers.lxxxiv Despite some improvement during the mid-1930s, Eureka’s sales 
volume and profitability never recovered; over the four years preceding World War Two it 
had cumulative losses of £1,200,000, while its 1941 vacuum sales represented only seven per 
cent of the industry total.lxxxv 
 Hoover avoided an existential crisis, but nevertheless faced a decline in market share 
to only 14.04 per cent of unit sales by 1939 and a crisis of profitability, as shown in Table 
1.lxxxvi Operating profit had fallen continuously during the Depression, from 13.5 per cent of 
net sales to a low of -3.9 per cent in 1932 and, while it recovered over 1935-37, it remained 
below half the 1929 ratio. Net profit was markedly higher, presumably reflecting Hoover’s 
extensive overseas operations, where it generally faced fewer competitors. Dollar and unit 
sales also remained below 1929 levels, with the exception of 1937. Cost of goods sold as a 
proportion of net sales was relatively stable, moving pro-cyclically. Conversely operating 
expenses (mainly sales and administrative expenses) rose sharply during the Depression and, 
while they fell during the recovery, they remained substantially higher than for 1929.  
 [Table 1 near here] 
Hoover’s problems reflected the rigidities of its “core competencies/capabilities” - 
interrelated, interdependent knowledge systems encompassing: technical systems; managerial 
systems; skills/knowledge base; and values and norms, that differentiate a company 
strategically. These tend to reflect the “imprint” of the company’s founders, early leaders, and 
initial successes, which creates a “dominant logic” for the firm, based on a shared 
history.lxxxvii The dynamic capabilities literature suggests that institutionalised capabilities 
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may lead to “incumbent inertia” to environmental changes. Under such circumstances even 
minor innovations can undermine the value of the firm’s deeply-embedded knowledge.lxxxviii 
This is particularly true for “architectural innovations”, which involve changes in how a 
product is configured, rather than innovations in individual components. Architectural 
innovations present incumbents with a subtle, but strong, challenge, as a firm’s information 
channels, information filters, and accumulated “architectural knowledge”, are all based 
around their existing configuration.lxxxix 
Hoover and Eureka faced such a challenge, in the form of Electrolux, which 
introduced the high-powered “tank-type” cleaner to the U.S. Market. This format dates back 
to the initial experimental phase of vacuum cleaner development in the 1900s, though by the 
end of World War One the upright vacuum cleaner had emerged as the “dominant design” in 
the USA. Electrolux, formed in 1919 by the merger of two Swedish firms, Svenska Elektron 
AB and Lux AB (which had commenced manufacturing tank-type cleaners before the First 
World War) - continued to develop the tank-type format, which proved popular in Europe 
(possibly reflecting the smaller houses of many European countries). Their Model V cleaner 
was exported to the USA from 1924, but, both this and its successor Model 11 (introduced in 
1927) were regarded as substantially underpowered in America, where they were mainly used 
as “dusters” for furniture and upholstery, or – as in New York, where sales were concentrated 
– for small apartments.xc  
[Figure 4 near here] 
The Electrolux Model 12, launched in 1933, constituted the first high-powered tank-
type cleaner on the U.S. market, combining both strong ease of use and dirt removal 
characteristics (see Figure 4).xci This rapidly catapulted Electrolux, which opened a factory in 
Old Greenwich, Connecticut, to manufacture it, in to the top rank of U.S. vacuum brands.xcii 
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The Model 12 can be regarded as a “competence-destroying” technological discontinuity, in 
that it essentially represented a new product class – with the key characteristic of ease of use 
(especially for non-floor uses such as stairs, furniture, and curtains).xciii While it never 
achieved the status of a “dominant design” (displacing the upright cleaner), it enjoyed huge 
popularity. In 1934 (the Model 12’s first full sales year) Electrolux overtook Hoover for the 
first time, selling 136,687 vacuums for $10,542,070, while Hoover sold 124,728 for 
$9,901,000.xciv In 1937 the Model 12 was replaced by the even more successful Model 30 – a 
design icon that had sold millions of units before being discontinued in 1954. 
Other durables sectors also witnessed new competitors during the Depression, using 
architectural innovations and leaner supply chains as the basis of their competitive advantage. 
Three of the four largest radio manufacturers of the 1920s failed to survive the Depression as 
significant players in the market, partly due to the development of the smaller, cheaper, 
“midget” radio format, aggressively marketed by new entrants such as Emerson and 
Philco.xcv The refrigerator and washing machine sectors also witnessed aggressive market 
entry, both by new manufacturers, such as Crosley, and – more importantly - retailer brands 
such as Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward, who cut prices chiefly through integrating 
production and distribution.xcvi Successful entrants varied in their business models, but a 
common factor was squeezing sales/distribution costs.  
Research commissioned by Ford, Bacon and Davis found that while Hoover owners 
were more enthusiastic about their vacuum’s cleaning performance, Electrolux owners were 
more enthusiastic regarding ease of use – as Electrolux’s “tank-type” design was easier to 
carry, easier to use with attachments, easier to clean furniture without moving it, easier to 
dispose of dirt, less noisy, and “not so hard on rugs”.  They concluded that:  “Housewives are 
buying Electrolux because they prefer its ease of use features which are apparent to them 
compared to the cleaning efficiencies of the Hoover which are not so apparent.” xcvii  
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Hoover struggled to counter Electrolux’s strong ease of use advantages, largely 
because they were inherent in to the tank-type format, which sucked in dirt through a long, 
light-weight hose. Switching to this format would involve abandoning much of their 
cumulative investments in vacuum features. For example their famous “positive agitation” 
system and their more recently-introduced “headlight” to illuminate dirt could not be 
transferred to a dust collector that was separated by the main body of the cleaner via a long 
hose.  Yet Hoover’s competitive problem was compounded by the fact that its sales 
demonstration continued to emphasise efficiency in removing dirt, apparently unaware of the 
need to modify its sales pitch to counter Electrolux’s strong ease of use appeal. This was 
particularly important in what had become a mature product market, with most major brands 
being relatively successful in removing dirt compared to earlier cleaners. 
In August 1936 Hoover introduced the Model 150 Ensemble, selling for $79.50 plus 
$16.50 for its cleaning tools (see Figure 4). This boasted a variety of new features, together 
with a classic modern design. Hoover advertised it as “The First Basically New Cleaner in 10 
Years”, emphasising its range of new mechanical innovations and features and, especially, its 
ease of use: 
One little lift or push says `How light. How easy it rolls.’ Hoover engineers have 
brought into the home for the first time a new metal amazing for its lightness – 
magnesium – until now used only in airplanes. One-third lighter than aluminium yet 
as strong. Only the new Hoover Cleaner offers the back-saving lightness of this new 
wonder-metal. xcviii  
 The heaviness of Hoover cleaners (compared to both tank-type and other upright 
brands) had always been Hoover’s Achilles heel, leaving it open to periodic inroads in market 
share from firms with lighter models, such as Air-Way and Eureka in the early 1920s.xcix The 
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150 Ensemble weighed 16.25 lbs (compared to 18lbs for its predecessor) and had various 
new ease of use features, including a simpler converter for attachments; a “time-to empty” 
signal, and an easy to empty filter bag.c However, its accompanying new salesman’s booklet, 
Steps to the Hoover Sale, followed its predecessors in focusing on the Hoover’s traditional 
strength of efficiency in drawing out dirt, demonstrated through various “tests” on the 
prospect’s carpet.  Ease of use was not mentioned until page 12, in the context of “improved 
features”. ci  Moreover, the booklet made no mention of the need to modify the traditional 
Hoover demonstration to counter the competitive threat from Electrolux. 
  
The audit of Hoover 
 In 1939 Hoover commissioned Ford, Bacon & Davis to conduct a review of its 
operations and business methods, with a view to making recommendations on how to 
increase their effectiveness and profitability. The consultants’ report emphasised Hoover’s 
very low operating profit and return on investment relative to other leading consumer 
durables’ firms.cii  This was supported by available data on large durables manufacturers. 
Hoover’s profits over 1936-38 were found to average only 4.2 per cent of gross investment 
applicable to operations, compared to 48.0 per cent for Electrolux and 18.0 per cent for 
America’s leading washer manufacturer, Maytag.ciii  
Moreover, this problem could not be solved simply through higher sales. Using 
figures supplied by Hoover (including an element of forecast for higher sales levels), the 
report estimated that operating profit would rise from 3.1 per cent of sales at 150,000 cleaners 
per year to a peak of around 7.4 – 7.5 per cent at 210,000 – 240,000 per year and then 
decline, to 6.9 per cent at an output of 300,000. This reflected the large proportion of selling 
expenses that either varied directly with volume, or - such as bonuses to executives and 
senior managers - increased more than proportionately with volume.civ Even these figures 
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were said to be optimistic, as they assumed considerably higher relative sales for Hoover’s 
more profitable “Norca” cleaners than had yet been achieved. Norcas had been introduced in 
1937 for “over the counter” sales by department and similar stores and had a much higher 
profit rate than their Hoover branded cleaners, owing to lower distribution costs.cv If the 
projected Norca figures were excluded, net profit was substantially lower, peaking at 4.9 per 
cent of net sales.  
Table 2 sets out the value chain for Hoover in 1938, together with estimates for 
Electrolux, provided by Ford, Bacon & Davis. Hoover’s net operating profit averaged only 
2.2 per cent, compared to 20.4 -24.5 per cent for Electrolux. The source of the Electrolux data 
was not given, but its high profitability is supported by data from the Electrolux archives, 
showing a 1934 net profit ratio of 18.0 per cent.cvi  The value chain highlights two principal 
differences in cost structures, which account for most of Electrolux’s higher profits. First, 
Electrolux provided higher commission to salesmen, but spent considerably less on 
supporting their activities through advertising, promotion, training, and supervision – the 
areas where Hoover had made progressively larger investments, to boost their market share. 
Secondly, while 15.8 per cent of Hoover’s list price went to the participating retailer, under 
its resale system, Electrolux’s direct sales supply chain had no dealer role and thus no costs 
under this heading.  
 [Table 2 near here] 
The 15.8 per cent dealer discount was found, in a large proportion of cases, to be 
excessive relative to services rendered under the resale system (letting Hoover use their name 
when calling on prospects; allowing salesmen to solicit demonstrations in-store; stocking 
inventory; dealing with instalment credits; and bearing part of the cost of any machines that 
reverted back to them). It was noted that Electrolux had built up its market share without 
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using dealers and market research indicated that many customers saw no advantage in the 
link with the dealer. The consultants thus recommended that Hoover should consider either 
discontinuing dealer participation or cutting its discount to dealers who did not render 
substantial sales promotion services from 15 per cent (excluding bonuses) to a maximum of 
12.5 per cent.cvii 
Ford, Bacon, and Davis noted that Hoover’s brand managers believed they could 
secure the same sales volume without dealer participation.cviii The same point had been made 
in May 1937 by C.B. Colston, Managing Director of Hoover’s UK subsidiary, which 
produced and marketed Hoovers for sale in Europe and the British Empire (excluding 
Canada). Colston (arguably the most senior Hoover executive who was not a family member) 
believed their selling costs could be very substantially reduced by employing better salesmen, 
which would require a substantially higher commission rate. He suggested that they might 
follow the plan of British Hoover’s Belgian sales subsidiary, where sales made directly by 
Hoover salesmen required no commission to dealers. E.L. Colston (Hoover UK’s Sales 
Director), then explained “at very great length” that in Europe the dealer was often more of a 
handicap than an asset and was not essential to instalment credit as, after the first four months 
of the agreement, the finance company took responsibility for the loan.cix However, this 
argument appears to have fallen on death ears (though it may account for a marginal 
reduction in dealer commission at some point in the late 1930s, from 14 to 13 per cent). 
The consultants also questioned Hoover’s long-standing assumption that increased 
sales depended primarily on increased manpower, showing that Hoover’s annual sales 
correlated much better with the index of industrial production than with their number of 
salesmen.cx This raised the question “Why is it necessary to have 3,937 salesmen in 1937 to 
sell the same volume as was sold by 1,859 salesmen in 1929.”cxi They argued that this mainly 
reflected the lower productivity of each salesman; obliging the company to increase the 
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salesforce to maintain volume. As Table 3 shows, average weekly unit sales per salesman had 
fallen by 38 per cent and the real value of commission had declined to only 72 per cent of its 
1929 value.  
[Table 3 near here] 
Declining salesmen’s productivity was attributed in part to Hoover’s heavy cost 
structure, compared to Electrolux, which enabled Electrolux to offer higher commission to 
salesmen– giving it a labour market advantage. Two other major vacuum firms that used 
direct sales, Air-way, and Rex Air, also had markedly higher commission rates than 
Hoover.cxii Ford, Bacon and Davis also noted Electrolux’s strong ease of use advantages, 
which were more obvious to the housewife than Hoover’s superior cleaning efficiency. They 
recommended that Hoover should explore how to improve their ease of use advantages and 
adapt the sales process to further emphasise ease of use. They also had more general 
criticisms of Hoover’s sales formula and training, arguing that the firm’s sales manuals, other 
sales aids, and training programme had, in their opinion, “insufficient inspiration… The 
material appears to be of routine character to an extent likely to become boresome.” cxiii 
Perhaps their most fundamental criticism was that Hoover’s senior managers focused 
on sales maximisation to such an extent that they neglected profitability: “The management is 
quite definitely volume-minded and is not sufficiently profit-minded. Whether the volume 
will produce adequate returns… has not been predetermined and no means such as thorough 
budgetary procedure... have been set up for predetermining profit objective for the 
business.”cxiv  Hoover was found to have insufficient budgetary control, together with, “a 
most conspicuous lack of profitmindedness on the part of the organisation as a whole. In a 
two-day session of senior sales managers… only once was profitability of operations even 
mentioned and then there was no elaboration or discussion of it.”cxv 
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Ford, Bacon and Davis emphasised that direct selling per se was not the problem, 
despite its high costs, reflected in high prices ($69.00 - $71.00 for the median models of 
vacuum firms that relied mainly on direct selling, compared to $43.00 - $49.50 for those 
using conventional retail channels).cxvi They noted that vacuum companies which had 
switched to dealer distribution had failed to match the sales of Hoover and Electrolux, or the 
profit rate as Electrolux – a finding corroborated by the collapse in Eureka’s sales volume 
following its termination of direct selling, discussed above. Interviews with retailers found no 
evidence of a trend towards growing over-the-counter distribution for vacuums; most 
admitted that in this sector demonstration was key, by showing the inefficiency of the 
housewife’s existing cleaner (which was less evident than for an old refrigerator, washing 
machine, or radio), a result echoed by a 1940 U.S. government investigation.cxvii While 
models lacking distinctive features had to be sold over the counter and compete on price, 
those with such features could most profitably be sold direct. Moreover, Hoover’s Norca 
cleaners, together with sales to dealers of factory re-built traded-in Hoovers (“Specials”) 
allowed them to tap the over-the-counter market without compromising their main brand.cxviii   
Like Eureka before them, Hoover’s managers reacted to their crisis in a manner that 
proved deeply counter-productive. Rather than implementing the consultant’s key 
recommendation – that commission income should be redistributed from over-rewarded 
retailers to under-rewarded salesmen - Hoover’s Sales Department tabled alternative 
proposals, which, perversely, maintained retailer commission rates and placed the main 
burden of cuts on the direct sales organisation.  They offered savings of $439,000 per year 
(trumping the $359,000 estimated savings from Ford, Bacon and Davis’s recommendations) 
through cuts to the Sales Department’s and the Service Department’s staff compensation 
plans; expense savings in these two departments; and a reduction in dealer trade-in 
participation. Detailed information on the revised compensation plans has not survived, 
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though – given that they involved a substantial reduction in sales staff compensation (for 
equivalent sales) – they must have involved a reduction in salesmen’s commission rates.cxix   
The revised compensation plans were introduced in May 27th 1940. Despite the week 
ending April 27th 1940 having seen the highest sales in Hoover’s prior history, the new 
system was followed by a sales slump, which was at least partly attributed to this new plan.cxx 
Further modifications to sales policies were cut short in 1941, when Hoover was called on to 
make an early start in munitions production, even before the USA formally entered the War. 
Their main contract involved manufacturing (eventually) 25 million highly-secretive variable 
time proximity fuses – a task which paid testament to their considerable engineering skills 
(having been likened in difficulty to compressing the components of an aircraft engine into 
the shape of an ice cream cone).cxxi  
However, the problems identified by the consultants continued to plague Hoover after 
World War Two; in 1954 profits amounted to only three per cent of sales, while Hoover’s 
market share had fallen to nine percent.cxxii Hoover’s engineers again came to the rescue, 
ironically, through finally developing a tank-type cleaner – the Hoover Constellation. 
Claimed to be the quietest vacuum on the market, the Constellation boasted a highly 
innovative mobility feature, the “Air-ride” which floated the cleaner like a hovercraft, using 
its own exhaust as the air source, while a striking space-age circular design accentuated its 
novelty. The Constellation improved Hoover’s market share – though it continued to be 
plagued by low profitability.cxxiii  
Conclusion 
Hoover’s declining profitability and the collapse of Eureka’s direct sales system 
illustrate how previously successful corporate practices, performance benchmarks, and value 
chain relationships can develop rigidities over time, reducing responsiveness to changes in 
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market or competitive conditions. Moreover, their reactions to their respective crises suggest 
that these same rigidities inhibited them from acknowledging and addressing the fundamental 
problems underlying their falling profitability. Such behaviour is by no means exceptional; 
the “threat rigidity” literature identifies numerous examples of companies reacting to crises 
via policies that act to compound their difficulties (and predictably so) - typically explained 
in terms of a tendency for organizations to behave conservatively rather than innovatively in 
threatening situations – especially under conditions of prior organizational rigidities.cxxiv Such 
conservative responses were also typical of incumbents in other durables sectors during the 
Depression, particularly the dominant radio firms of the 1920s, which failed to effectively 
react to new entrants that capitalised on leaner supply chains and cost-reducing architectural 
innovations. 
  As Tushman and Anderson have noted, “liabilities of age and tradition” can 
constrain incumbents facing competence-destroying discontinuities.cxxv Hoover in particular 
appears to have fallen into a “competency trap”: its core competencies - extensive sales 
support investment (including dealer participation), and formidable R&D activities focused 
primarily on more efficient dirt removal,  in conjunction with assumptions that profits were 
driven by sales, and,  in turn, by manpower - having become core rigidities.cxxvi As Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen note, “In dynamic environments, narcissistic organizations are likely to be 
impaired.”cxxvii Values which had initially partly served to “sell” Hoover’s product, “system” 
and “mission” to its salesforce had become “core” to all levels of the company, making even 
a cut in salesforce compensation than ran directly counter to the recommendations of their 
consultants preferable to the alternative – departing from the system that had represented the 
“gospel” of vacuum salesmanship for most Hoover executives throughout their working lives.  
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Table 1: Hoover’s sales, costs, and profits, 1929-1939 
 
Year           Net sales      Costs to net sales ratios Income to sales ratios
Dollars Units Cost of goods sold Operating expenses Total Operating* Net**
1929 14,691,000 189,859 28.6 57.2 85.8 13.5 15.4
1930 13,211,000 168,067 27.8 67.4 95.2 4.2 9.0
1931 11,084,000 133,859 26.5 71.6 98.1 1.1 6.1
1932 8,998,000   123,895 27.4 75.2 102.6 -3.9 1.3
1933 7,854,000   104,125 24.9 73.0 97.9 0.6 7.4
1934 9,901,000   124,728 26.7 72.6 99.3 0.4 10.0
1935 11,420,000 147,384 29.2 66.3 95.5 4.2 8.0
1936 13,125,000 168,939 30.8 66.0 96.8 2.8 5.9
1937 15,116,000 201,275 29.9 63.4 93.3 6.3 9.5
1938 12,665,000 162,278 29.8 71.3 101.1 -1.6 14.1
Average 11,806,000 152,441 28.2 68.4 96.6 3.4 9.1
 
Sources, unit sales, HHC, Hoover chronology by Lee P. Heinrich (undated, c. 1940s); other 
data, Ford, Bacon, and Davis report, Volume 2, Exhibit 1.  
Notes: * Net sales minus total costs, plus other net income affecting operations. ** Operating 
income plus other net income, before taxes.  
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Table 2: The value chains for Hoover and Electrolux in 1938 (percentage of net sales) 
Costs: Hoover Electrolux
Manufacturing 22.6 20.0 - 22.6
Dealer discounts 15.8 0.0
Sales management & administration
    Branch and district sales organisation 12.9 n.a.
    Other 12.1 na.
   Total 25.0 23.5 - 25.0
Sales support activities
    Sales personnel education 1.0 0.0
    Sales promotion 0.9 0.5
    Advertising 3.6 1.0
   Supervision 7.2 3.0
   Total 12.7 4.5
Salesmen's remuneration 21.7 27.5
Total costs 97.8 75.5 - 79.6
Operating Profit 2.2 20.4 - 24.5  
Source: HCC, Ford, Bacon, and Davis report, 71.  
 
Notes: Electrolux's figures are estimates by the consultants. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Hoover’s salesmen's productivity, 1929 and 1937 
Year 1929 1937
Number of cleaners sold 189,755 200,663 
Number sold by Hoover salesmen 149,189 194,990 
Number of salesmen on list 1,859     3,937     
Cleaners sold per man per week 1.54 0.95
Average unit price ($) 79.43 73.84
Retail billings per man per week ($) 123.00 70.00
Commission rate (percent; net, after trade-in 
participation)
18.00 20.02
Commission per man per week ($) 22.10 14.01
Real value of commission per man-week ($) 22.10 15.83  
Source: HCC, Ford, Bacon, and Davis report, 87 & 162. 
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Figure 1: Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co. outside sales organisation, May 1927. 
 
Divisional Sales Managers (4)
 Wholesale Sales Managers (57)*   Retail Sales Managers (40)
  Supervisors (242)
Credits Assistants Personnel Officer
Crew Managers (524)
Resale Dept. Managers (103) Campaign Crew Managers (20)   Resalemen (1,491)
    Salesmen (358)  
 
Source: Hagley Museum Library & Archives, 2069/9/16, Victor Talking Machine Co., Consignment selling, Victor Talking Machine Co. field survey, 1926-
27. Reports of interview with Mr C.W. Phister, Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co., 26 May 1927.  
Notes: *Wholesale sales manager numbers include assistants. Eureka also employed a staff of eight auditors and, at each important branch, a personnel 
officer.   
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Figure 2: Crowds assembled for one of the early Hoover international convention 
parades 
 
Source: HHC, Hoover Co. "Pictorial History of Hoover International Conventions”, n.d., c. 
1923. 
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Figure 3: Costs and profits as a proportion of net sales, and costs per machine, for Eureka, 
1921-29 
 
 
Sources: 1921-22, Hagley Museum Library & Archives, 2069/9/16, Victor Talking Machine 
Co., Consignment selling, Victor Talking Machine Co. field survey, 1926-27. Reports of 
interview with Mr C.W. Phister, Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co., 26 May 1927; 1923-29, 
Moody’s Investment Service, Moody’s Manual of Investments. American and Foreign. 
Industrial Securities (New York: Moody’s); 1929, 54; 1930, 604. 
 
Notes: 1929 figures include Eureka’s new London sales subsidiary. Costs include 
depreciation.  Profits are shown before deductions of fixed charges and federal taxes. 
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Figure 4: The Electrolux Model 12 and the Hoover 
Model 150 Ensemble. 
 
 
Reproduced by kind permission of Tom 
Gasko. 
 
 
 
 
Photo courtesy of Hoover Historical 
Center/Walsh University, North Canton, 
Ohio. 
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